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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA)' guarantees
free trade between the United States and its largest trading partner.2 In
effect since January 1, 1989, the FTA has drawn substantial critical atten-
tion.' One aspect of the treaty has provoked intense constitutional scrutiny
in the United States. The FTA requires binding binational arbitral review
of antidumping and countervailing duty orders issued by administrative
agencies of each nation. Commentators have almost uniformly concluded
that the binational arbitration provisions comply with the United States
Constitution.
4
Contrary to the virtual consensus among observers of the FTA, this
Article argues that the FTA violates both Article II and the Appointments
1. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 293 [hereinafter FTA].
2. Id. art. 102, at 293 (stating FTA goal of eliminating trade barriers).
3. See, e.g., Jun~rr H. BELLO, A GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT (1990); JUDITH H. BELLO & HOMER E. MOYER, JR., THE U.S.-CANADA TRADE
AGREEMENT (PLI Com. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 444, 1989); Stewart A.
Baker & Shelly P. Battram, The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 23 INT'L LAW.
37 (1989); Harold H. Koh, The Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on the
Proposed United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 193 (1987). The
FTA's dispute resolution mechanisms are an especially popular topic. See, e.g., David P.
Cluchey, Dispute Resolution Provisions of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,
40 ME. L. REV. 335 (1988); Ton J.M. Zuijdwijk, Dispute Settlement Mechanisms Under the
Free Trade Agreement, 40 ME. L. REv. 325 (1988).
4. See Gordon A. Christenson & Kimberly Gambrel, Constitutionality of Binational
Panel Review in Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 23 INT'L LAw. 401 (1989); Thomas W.
Bark, Note, The Binational Panel Mechanism for Reviewing United States-Canadian Antid-
umping and Countervailing Duty Determinations: A Constitutional Dilemma?, 29 VA. J. INT'L
L. 681 (1989); Peter Huston, Note, Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Dispute Settlement
Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Is the Process Constitutional?, 23
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 529 (1990); Gilad Y. Ohana, Note, The Constitutionality of Chapter 19
of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Article III and the Minimum Scope of
Judicial Review, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 897 (1989); Dave Resnicoff, Note, The United States-
Canada Free-Trade Agreement and the U.S. Constitution: Does Article III Allow Binational
Panel Review of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations?, 13 B.C. INT'L &
Con'. L. REv. 237 (1990). One student comment argues that the FTA violates Article III. See
Karen H. Albright, Comment, Chapter 19 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement:
An Unconstitutional Preclusion of Article III Review, 5 CONN. J. INT'L L. 317, 328-48 (1989).
5. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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Clause 6 of the Constitution. This Article does not dispute the benefits of
free trade or of international arbitration. Nor does this Article address the
merits of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. 7 Rather, in a belief
that economic and political benefits flowing from the FTA should not color
constitutional analysis, this Article concludes that the FTA offends the
separation of powers. The FTA not only threatens the integrity of the
federal judiciary but also undermines the strict procedures for the appoint-
ment of officers of the United States. After briefly sketching the FTA's
arbitral review provisions, I argue that the FTA violates Article III by
deviating from the recognized methods for exerting federal adjudicatory
power. I then argue that the FTA's system for the appointment of arbitrators
neither complies with the Appointments Clause nor justifies an exception
allowing the federal government to delegate its authority to persons who
are not officers of the United States.8
Though a seemingly unlikely subject for an epic constitutional struggle,
the FTA provides the ideal subject for what promises to be the battle of
6. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
7. Cf., e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International
Trzde, 100 HARv. L. Ray. 546, 552-79, 604-09 (1987) (characterizing countervailing duty laws
as "market corrective" and proposing their elimination).
8. This Article concedes that other constitutional challenges to the FTA would probably
fail. Whatever its defects under Article III and the Appointments Clause, the FTA's arbitral
review scheme provides litigants enough procedural protections to satisfy the constitutional
balance between due process and governmental interests. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 349 (1976). The commentary on the FTA has adequately addressed the due process
concerns raised by the FTA. See Christenson & Gambrel, supra note 4, at 419-23; Bark, supra
note 4, at 704-10; Ohana, supra note 4, at 911-12, 915-19.
A more elaborate, though equally unsuccessful, constitutional challenge would attack the
role of American federal judges in the FTA's "extraordinary challenge committees," described
in greater detail, in part II.C. In confining the federal judicial power to the resolution of
cases or controversies, Article III of the Constitution may also prevent federal judges from
performing nonjudicial functions within the United States government. Cf. U.S. CoNsT. art.
I, § 6, cl. 2 (ineligibility and incompatibility clauses). The FTA's placement of at least one
former or sitting federal judge on each extraordinary challenge committee raises a plausible
but probably ineffective Article III objection. In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
397-408 (1989), the Supreme Court repelled a far more serious challenge by condoning the
presence of federal judges on the United States Sentencing Commission. Similarly, in Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677-85 (1988), the Court allowed senior judges to serve on a "special
division" of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that
appointed independent counsel for the prosecution of certain executive officers. See also United
States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1851) (permitting federal judge to issue advisory
opinions as war claims commissioner); 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 423 (1945) (suggesting that federal
judges could serve at Nuremberg war crimes trials). Like the Sentencing Commission in
Mistretta, the war claims commission in Ferreira, and the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the
FTA committees will conscript no unwilling judges. See Christenson & Gambrel, supra note
4, at 428 ("We find no impediment ... to the voluntary service of article III judges with
international tribunals"). Moreover, the committees' task more closely resembles a judicial
function than does the arguably legislative mission of the Sentencing Commission or the
admittedly executive function of Morrison's "special division."
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Gettysburg in the struggle to define separation of powers. 9 Proponents of
a flexible approach to separation of powers have extracted from Morrison
v. Olson'0 and Mistretta v. United States" the seeds of a separation-of-
powers counterrevolution. 2 A decision striking down the FTA's arbitral
review provisions would signal in the strongest fashion that any declaration
of victory by the counterrevolutionaries would be premature. By abridging
both the independence of the judiciary and the appointment power of the
executive; the FTA encounters constitutional objections along two major
fault lines in the separation-of-powers terrain. The FTA's unconstitutionality
signifies far more than failure to fulfill the technical rigors of complex
doctrines. Individually, either the replacement of Article III courts in the
review of administrative determinations or the failure to appoint officers
according to the Appointments Clause would substantially erode govern-
mental structure and political accountability. Together, these constitutional
defects spoil hopes for fair, accountable adjudication under the antidumping
and countervailing duty laws.
II. AxarrRAL REviEw UNDER THE FTA
In the United States, the International Trade Administration (ITA) and
the International Trade Commission (ITC) exercise primary jurisdiction over
international trade laws. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)13 entitles member nations to retain their antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws.' 4 Dumping involves the introduction of items into a
country at a price less than the value of a comparable item in the country
of origin. 5 A countervailing duty offsets an unfair export or production
subsidy granted by the government of the country of origin.' 6 Dumping has
played a particularly prominent role in the development of United States-
9. The armies at Gettysburg likewise clashed over a seemingly trivial prize-a supply
of shoes. See SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR: FREDERICKSBURG TO MERIDIAN 465 (1963).
10. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
11. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
12. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-
Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 430 (1987); Peter L. Strauss, Formal
and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987); Edward Susolik, Note, Separation of Powers and Liberty: The
Appointments Clause, Morrison v. Olson, and Rule of Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1557
(1990). But see, e.g., Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why
the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 313 (1989).
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, 55 U.N.T.S.
187.
14. See generally Ruth E. Olson, Note, GA TT-Legal Application of Safeguards in the
Context of Regional Trade Arrangements and Its Implications For the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1488 (1989).
15. See generally EDMOND McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 311-98 (1986)
(discussing dumping and countervailing duty laws).
16. See generally id.
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Canada trade relations.' 7 Under American law, the ITA and ITC have the
authority to impose a duty on imported goods that enjoy an unfair trade
advantage over domestic goods because of dumping or foreign subsidies.'
Affected parties may ordinarily seek judicial review of ITA and ITC
determinations in the Court of International Trade (CIT), an Article III
court.19 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court may in turn review the decisions of the CIT.
20
A. Invoking the Arbitral Review Process
The FTA preserves the signatory nations' antidumping and counter-
vailing duties laws .2  Chapter Nineteen of the FTA, however, replaces
judicial review in the United States and Canada with arbitration by a
binational panel. Despite leaving domestic judicial review theoretically pos-
sible, the FTA allows one party to force arbitral review in practically all
cases. Indeed, since the first FTA panel convened to review an ITA
antidumping determination on the merits,2 the CIT has not reviewed an
ITA or ITC determination covered by the FTA. Curiously, FTA panels
almost invariably review American agency determinations-FTA panels rarely
review the Canadian International Trade Tribunal or the Canadian Ministry
of National Revenue.Y Once the ITA and ITC have made a final determi-
nation, either nation must invoke panel review upon the request of a party
who would otherwise be entitled to judicial review under American law.
24
Although the FTA permits the governments to request review on their own
initiative,21 the Implementation Act bars the United States from requesting
review unless a private party requests it.26 As a result, the joint Secretariat
17. See Calvin S. Goldman, Competition, Anti-Dumping, and the Canada-U.S. Trade
Negotiations, 12 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 95 (1987); Calvin S. Goldman, Bilateral Aspects of
Canadian Competition Policy, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 401 (1988).
18. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677k (1988).
19. See id. §§ 1514-1515, 1516a; 28 U.S.C. §§ 251-252, 2631(a) (1988).
20. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1295(a)(5), 1585 (1988).
21. See FTA, supra note 1, art. 1902(1), at 386.
22. See Clearbrook Packers, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Commerce (In re Red
Raspberries from Canada), Panel No. USA-89-1904-01, 1989 FTAPD LEXIS 5, 1989 WL
250301 (Binational Panel Dec. 15, 1989); Request for Panel Review, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,777
(1989).
23. In re Certain Beer Originating in or Exported from the United States, Panel No.
CDA-91-1904-02, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 5 (Binatidnal Panel Aug. 26, 1992); In re Certain Beer
Originating in or Exported from the United States, Panel No. CDA-91-1904-01, 1992 FTAPD
LEXIS 3, 1992 WL 212443 (Binational Panel Aug. 6, 1992). Baldor Elec. Co. v. Canadian
Int'l Trade Tribunal (In re Certain Dumped Integral Horsepower Induction Motors), Panel
No. CDA-90-1904-01, 1991 FTAPD LEXIS 9, 1991 WL 192125 (Binational Panel Sept. 11,
1991); see also In re Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring,
Panel No. CDA-89-1807-01, 1989 FTAPD LEXIS 6, 1989 WL 250302 (Binational Panel Oct.
16, 1989) (reviewing Canadian fishing regulations for compliance with GATT art. XX(g)).
24. See FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(5), at 388.
25. See id.
26. See United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-449, § 401(c), 102 Stat. 1851, 1883 (1988) [hereinafter Implementation Act] (codified
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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established under Article 1909 of the FTA serves primarily to accommodate
private requests for arbitral review.
27
To facilitate analysis, I will assume that a challenge to the FTA's
arbitral review provisions will arise in an ordinary antidumping case resem-
bling an actual dispute over new steel rail from Canada.n A Canadian
exporter doing business in the United States will challenge the ITA's
determination of sales at less than fair value and of material injury to an
industry in the United States. 29 Such a determination justifies the imposition
of "an antidumping duty ... in an amount equal to the amount by which
the foreign market value exceeds the United States price." 30 The exporter
surely will request arbitral review; whereas judicial review provides an all-
American forum, a panel offers Canadian representation. Therefore, the
importer will request arbitral review of a wholly or partially adverse agency
determination (that is, one imposing a duty) by- notifying the American
Secretary within thirty days. 1'
By contrast, if the domestic competitor is disappointed with the ITA
determination, it will be content with American judicial review. Nevertheless,
the exporter can still invoke panel review. Initially, the competitor will
invoke its underlying right to review by the CIT.3 2 An interested party must
ordinarily seek judicial review within thirty days of a final agency deter-
mination.3" To accommodate binational panel review, the Implementation
Act postpones CIT review for thirty-one days34 and requires the competitor
to notify all other interested parties within twenty days of its intent to seek
judicial review. 3 The exporter may then request arbitral review. 36 Under
these provisions, the exporter can always remove its competitor's petition
for judicial review to a binational panel. Removal of an antidumping or
countervailing duty dispute to an FTA panel eliminates all participation by
the CIT and higher levels of the federal judiciary.
27. The United States, Canada, and Mexico have signed the North American Free Trade
Agreement, Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., available in LEXIS, GENFED-EXTRA Database;
WL, NAFTA Database (awaiting ratification as this article went to press) [hereinafter NAFTA].
Like the FTA, NAFTA provides for multinational arbitral review of each signatory nation's
antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. See id. ch. 19. If NAFTA is ratified it
would face the same constitutional objections that now threaten the FTA.
28. See, e.g., Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce (In re New Steel
Rail, Except Light Rail, From Canada), Panel No. USA-89-1904-08, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 5,
1990 WL 299937 (Binational Panel Aug. 30, 1990); Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States Int'l
Trade Comm'n (In re New Steel Rails from Canada), Panel Nos. USA-89-1904-09, USA-89-
1904-10, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 6, 1990 WL 299944 (Binational Panel Aug. 13, 1990).
29. See New Steel Rail, Except Light Rail, From Canada, 54 Fed. Reg. 31,984 (Int'l
Trade'Admin. Aug. 3, 1989).
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988).
31. See Implementation Act § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(8)(A) (1988).
32. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1988).
33. See id. § 1516a(a)(2) (1988).
34. See Implementation Act § 401(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(5) (1988).
35. See id. § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(3)(B) (1988).
36. See id. § 403(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(8) (1988).
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B. Selecting Panelists for Arbitral Review
Upon a request for arbitral review, the two nations will select a five-
member binational panel.37 The United States Trade Representative selects
on behalf of the United States. 8 Each nation selects two panelists from a
jointly developed roster of fifty candidates chosen "on the basis of objec-
tivity, reliability, sound judgment, and general familiarity with international
trade law." 3 9 The two nations together choose the fifth panelist. If the
governments cannot agree, the other panelists decide. If the panelists disa-
gree, a drawing decides the fifth panelist.40
Within the United States, an interagency group led by the Trade
Representative develops a list of American panel candidates after the Trade
Representative consults the appropriate congressional committees.41 On her
own initiative, the Trade Representative may place candidates on the FTA
rosters ,and appoint panelists. 42 She may also "act to make a joint appoint-
ment" with the Canadian government. She must appoint panelists and
committee members according to the FTA's eligibility criteria, without
regard to political affiliation. 4 The process of identifying candidates and
developing rosters starts anew each year.
45
C. The Effect of Arbitral Review
An FTA panel applies the same standard of review as the CIT.46 Under
binational rules of procedure that apply to both nations, the panel may
uphold or remand an agency determination. 47 The FTA permits extraordinary
challenges to panel decisions if a panelist's gross misconduct or a procedural
irregularity materially affects the panel's integrity.4 Each extraordinary
challenge committee of three includes at least one retired or active federal
judge from the United States. 49 The structure of the FTA review process
renders extraordinary challenges almost inaccessible, and the only extraor-
dinary challenge committee ever convened has affirmed the decision of the
binational panel below. 0 In all other circumstances, both the FTA and the
37. See FTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(2)-(3), at 393.
38. See Implementation Act § 405(a), 102 Stat. at 1888.
39. FTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(1), at 393.
40. See id. annex 1901.2(3), at 393.
41. See Implementation Act § 405(a)(1), (3)-(5), 102 Stat. at 1888-90.
42. See id. § 405(a)(2), (6), 102 Stat. at 1888-91.
43. Id. § 405(a)(6)(B)(iii), 102 Stat. at 1891.
44. See id. § 405(a)(2)(B), 102 Stat. at 1888-89.
45. See id. § 405(a)(3)(A), 102 Stat. at 1889. Part IV, infra, which discusses Appointments
Clause issues, describes the selection of panelists in greater detail.
46. See FTA, supra note 1, arts. 1904(3), 1911, at 387, 391-93.
47. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 356.3-.8 (1992).
48. See FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(13), annex 1904.13, at 388-89, 395.
49. See id. annex 1904.13, at 395.
SO. See In re Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. ECC-91-1904-01-
USA, 1991 FITAPD LEXIS 7, 1991 WL 153112 (Extraordinary Challenge Comm. June 14,
1991).
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Implementation Act preclude judicial review of panel decisions on the
merits. " Unless overturned by an extraordinary challenge committee, re-
mands from the panel bind the ITA and the ITC.52 If an American court
finds that the panel lacks the legal authority to bind the federal agencies,
a fallback implementation provision purportedly authorizes the President to
accept panel remands on behalf of the United States.53
Thirty days after publication of notice in the Federal Register that panel
review has ended, a party to that proceeding may file a constitutional
challenge. 54 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to the constitutionality of
the panel review system.55 The Implementation Act then guarantees an
appeal of right to the Supreme Court.56 The CIT exercises jurisdiction over
all other constitutional challenges.
5 7
D. The FTA's Vulnerability to Constitutional Attack
The FTA's status as "international" law does not shield it from
constitutional attack. A treaty is no less than "the law of the land" as a
matter of American constitutional law,5" but it carries no greater domestic
weight by virtue of its "international" character. A valid treaty has no
more positivistic value than a valid statute and may be superseded by
ordinary domestic legislation.5 9 Although conflicting legislation does not
relieve the United States of treaty obligations as a matter of international
law, Congress may compel the United States to default on a treaty merely
by passing a contradictory statute. 60 The Supreme Court long ago recognized
that "a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in
violation of that instrument." 6' More recently the Court has imposed
constitutional scrutiny on legislation intended to carry out American treaty
obligations, reasoning that "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer
power on the Congress ... which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution. ' 62 The Constitution therefore governs the actions of FTA
51. See Implementation Act § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(2) (1988); id. § 402(a), 28
U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1988); FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(11), at 388.
52. See Implementation Act § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(A) (1988).
53. See id. § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(B) (1988).
54. See id. § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(A) (1988).
55. See id.
56. See id. § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(H) (1988).
57. See id. § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(B) (1988).
58. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); cf. The Paqueta Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction").
59. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,'
600 (1889) ("[T]he last expression of the sovereign will must control").
60. See Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598-600 (1884).
61. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 (1871).
62. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 44
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (acquiescing in plurality's premise); id. at 67 (Harlan,
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panelists, who not only derive their authority from a treaty of the United
States but also apply the substantive law of the United States when reviewing
ITA and ITC determinations.
63
III. VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE III
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Contin-
uance in Office.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority .... 6
Article III of the United States Constitution restricts congressional power
to assign. jurisdiction over certain matters to "legislative courts," whose
judges lack life tenure and salary protection. 65 Although the words of Article
III direct that the federal judicial power "shall be vested" in courts whose
judges enjoy these protections, the Supreme Court has eschewed a literal
interpretation of Article III. Instead, the Court has developed a set of
elaborate, obscure rules for determining the conditions under which Congress
may confer federal adjudicatory power outside the judicial branch. To
understand how the FTA might violate Article III, one must first endure
an abbreviated and necessarily oversimplified survey of the Court's Article
III decisions.
A. A Survey of Article III Case Law
Toward the end of the Lochner66 era, the Supreme Court in 1930
threatened to curb judicial participation in the transformation of the regu-
latory state by holding that the power to license was an "administrative"
function beyond the scope of Article 111.67 Two years later, in a landmark
J., concurring in the result) (same); cf. De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890)
(suggesting that federal government may not, by treaty, cede state territory to foreign nation
without state's consent or strip state of republican form of government).
63. See FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(2), at 387; id. preamble, at 368.
64. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, §§ 1-2.
65. See generally Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architechture: Legislative and
Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990) (discussing constitutional
problems with non-Article III courts); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Admin-
istrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARv. L. REv. 915 (1988) (same).
66. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
67. See Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 468-70 (1930); cf.
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410 (1792) (holding that duty to render nonfinal advisory
opinion may not be imposed on federal judge). But cf. United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 40, 51 (1851) (permitting federal judge to issue'advisory opinions in his adjudicative,
non-Article III capacity as war claims commissioner). See generally Louis L. JAss, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 103-09 (1965).
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decision that heralded the coming of the New Deal, the Supreme Court
charted an alternate course through Article III that endures to this day. In
Crowell v. Benson,68 the Court allowed an administrative agency to resolve
workers' compensation disputes between private parties as long as a review-
ing Article III court could decide all questions of law, "constitutional
facts," and "jurisdictional facts." 69 Although Crowell's "jurisdictional fact"
doctrine is a dead letter,70 the Supreme Court continues to reserve de novo
judicial judgment over certain factual findings such as the admissibility of
coerced confessions.
71
The Court issued its most significant attempt to redefine congressional
power *to grant federal jurisdiction to non-Article III tribunals in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.72 Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion outlined the two permitted exceptions to the general
requirement that the federal judicial power be exercised by Article III
judges. First, Congress could create legislative courts in a limited number
of historically recognized exceptions-territorial courts, military courts, and
courts adjudicating "public rights. '73 Second, under certain circumstances,
non-Article III "adjuncts" could adjudicate private rights to the extent
permitted by Crowell.74 Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred in the
judgment, reasoning that Congress could not confer broad jurisdiction on
non-Article III bankruptcy courts to adjudicate state-law claims that were
only tangentially related to the federal bankruptcy laws.75
Since Northern Pipeline, the Court has twice upheld the constitutionality
of non-Article III tribunals-first in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co. 76 and later in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor.77 In Union Carbide, the Court reviewed the binding arbitration
provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FI-
FRA).78 FIFRA allows pesticide manufacturers seeking to register a product
68. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
69. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 49-56 (1932); accord United States v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1980) (extending Crowell's rationale to uphold use of federal magistrates
as district court adjuncts in criminal cases).
70. See, e.g., O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs., 380 U.S. 359, 362 (1965);
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 142 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); South Chicago
Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 258 (1940); Bernard Schwartz, Does the Ghost of
Crowell v. Benson Still Walk?, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 163 (1949).
71. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, I11 S. Ct. 1246, 1252 (1991); Miller v. Fenton,
474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985). Likewise, the Court has been willing to overlook even jury
determinations as to libel against public figures and as to obscenity. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
72. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
73. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-76
(1982) (plurality opinion).
74. See id. at 81-86.
75. See id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
76. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
77. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).




with the Environmental Protection Agency to rely on other manufacturers'
previously submitted research data, provided that the later registrant pays
compensation for the prior registrant's trade secrets.7 9 Trade secret protection
is a creature of state law, 0 and its abrogation would support a Fifth
Amendment takings claim in the absence of other remedies. 8 ' Judicial review
of the private arbitration needed to resolve disputes over amounts of
compensation is limited to review for "fraud, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct. ' 82 In upholding FIFRA's arbitration scheme, the Court declined
to adopt the bright-line approach of the Northern Pipeline plurality. Instead,
the Union Carbide Court observed "that Congress may not vest in a non-
Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue
binding orders .in a traditional contract action arising under state law,
without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate
review.' '83
Schor involved the statutory authority of the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission (CFTC) to hear state-law counterclaims arising out of
commodity brokers' violations of federal laws banning fraudulent or ma-
nipulative conduct u After recognizing the Commission's efficiency and
expertise, the Court identified the two discrete reasons for establishing an
independent judiciary: fairness to litigants and separation of powers."' The
defendant's consent to a CFTC proceeding in lieu of federal court litigation
obviated fairness concerns.8 6 The Court assessed the Commission's potential
for encroaching upon the federal judiciary by examining
the extent to which "the essential attributes of judicial power" are
reserved to Article III courts, and conversely, the extent to which
the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and
powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and
importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article 111.87
The Court concluded that any intrusion on the integrity of federal courts
would be de minimis.
79. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1988).
80. See, e.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to -343 (Michie
1992); 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
81. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-04, 1016-19 (1984).
82. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(l)(D)(ii) (1988); cf. FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(13), at 388-89
(restricting "extraordinary challenges" under FTA to limited role of testing for fraud, departure
from rules, or gross misconduct within binational arbitration).
83. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985) (discussing
interpretation of Court's holding in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)).
84. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 835-36 (1986); see 7
U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
85. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 848.
86. See id. at 848-50.
87. Id. at 851.
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In the wake of Union Carbide and Schor, some commentators have
concluded that Northern Pipeline's literalist approach to Article III no
longer controls." The confusion created by Union Carbide and Schor may
tempt supporters of the FTA's arbitral review scheme to declare that the
Supreme Court has adopted outright the functional balancing test of the
Northern Pipeline dissent.89 To succeed, an Article III challenge to arbitral
review under the FTA must characterize the post-Northern Pipeline law as
narrowly as possible. Rather than concede that the Court has adopted some
balancing test, which the FTA's supporters could easily win, an opponent
of arbitral review must attempt to confine Union Carbide and Schor to
their facts. Under the narrowest reading of Union Carbide, the Court will
treat a state-law right as a "public right" if a federally created right against
the United States measures itself against or conditions itself upon an
underlying state-law entitlement. Such a definition of "public rights" con-
forms to the test for whether a case brought to enforce a right created
under state law "arises under" federal law for purposes of federal question
jurisdiction. 9° Likewise, a litigant can reconcile Schor with prior Article III
precedent. Schor expressly noted that, like the workers' compensation board
in Crowell, the CFTC exerted counterclaim jurisdiction subject to de novo
review by Article III courts. 9' Because arbitral review under the FTA differs
materially from the schemes upheld in Crowell, Union Carbide, and Schor,
the relaxed Article III scrutiny used in these cases cannot apply to the FTA.
The FTA assigns the ultimate determination of the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws to an arbitral panel as an unreviewable, non-Article
III body. By contrast, previously upheld schemes have permitted at least
limited review by article III courts. The FTA supplants Article III review
with a binational panel system for all nonconstitutional claims. This com-
promise between some Article III participation, however limited, and total
preclusion of judicial review raises unique constitutional objections.
Of the exceptions to Article III recognized in Northern Pipeline,92 only
the "public rights" exception can justify the FTA system. Arbitral tribunals
88. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 65, at 917; Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine,
Shoring Up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CTFC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U.
L. REV. 85, 101-02, 106-07 (1988).
89. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 115
(1982) (White, J., dissenting) ("The burden on Article III-values should ... be measured
against the values Congress hopes to serve through the use of Article I courts").
90. See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921) (holding that
federal courts have jurisdiction "where it appears from the bill or statement of the plaintiff
that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application of the Constitution or
laws of the United States"); cf. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804, 817 (1986) (holding "that a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an
element of a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be no
private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim 'arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"').
91. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852-53 (1986).
92. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 63-70 (plurality opinion).
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under the FTA are not territorial or military courts. Furthermore, because
the FTA eliminates Article III review of ITA and ITC determinations under
the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, Crowell's "adjunct" theory
cannot save arbitral review. After describing how the FTA could provide a
platform for the revitalization of an ancient view of mandatory jurisdiction
under Article III, I compare exclusive reliance on arbitral review to the two
recognized ways Congress can restrict federal jurisdiction: (1) total reliance
on an administrative tribunal to adjudicate antidumping and countervailing
duty entitlements as "public rights" and (2) initial administrative decision-
making followed by judicial review. Thanks to the Supreme Court's liberal
interpretation of standing in Article III challenges93 and the Implementation
Act's expedited review provisions,9 a litigant should encounter no justicia-
bility problems.
B. Redefining Article III Through a Frontal Attack on the FTA
As a matter of litigation strategy, an enemy of the FTA's arbitral review
provisions may find it most effective to open fire with the broadest and
potentially most devastating salvo. Under the FTA, the federal judiciary
altogether lacks jurisdiction over nonconstitutional aspects of antidumping
and countervailing duty disputes arising under the laws and treaties of the
United States. This flat denial of jurisdiction threatens to feed the rekindled
flames of an ancient theory on Congress's obligation to vest jurisdiction in
the federal judiciary.
The First Judiciary Act rejected the view that Article III obligates
Congress to vest federal courts with the full scope of original and appellate
federal jurisdiction.9 In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,96 however, Justice Story
argued that Congress must vest all of the judicial power "either in an
original or appellate form" in a federal court.97 He limited this argument
to the first three categories of cases designated with the word "all" in
Article III, section 2-cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties
of the United States; cases "affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls," and admiralty and maritime cases. 98 As to the remaining
party-specific bases of federal jurisdiction, Justice Story thought that Con-
gress could "qualify the jurisdiction, original or appellate, in such manner
as public policy might dictate." 99 Though never formally adopted by the
93. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 582 (1985).
94. See Implementation Act § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(A), (H) (1988).
95. See William R. Casto, The First Congress's Understanding of Its Authority over the
Federal Courts' Jurisdiction, 26 B.C. L. REv. 1101 (1985).
96. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
97. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816).
98. See id. at 334 ("In this class the expression is, and that the judicial power shall
extend to all cases; but in the subsequent part of the clause, which embraces all the other
cases of national cognizance, and forms the second class, the word 'all' is dropped seemingly
ex industria") (emphasis added).
99. Id.
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Supreme Court, Justice Story's thesis has substantial historical support.'00
Akhil Reed Amar has revived this theory, arguing that "[t]he judicial power
of the United States must, as an absolute minimum, comprehend the subject
matter jurisdiction to decide finally all cases involving federal questions,
admiralty, or public ambassadors.' 0
Under this theory, the FTA flunks the test of Article III constitutionality
because it forecloses federal jurisdiction over the resolution of antidumping
and countervailing duty laws arising under laws and treaties of the United
States. Although the FTA does not invite a challenge on the ground that
it denies a federal forum for the assertion of constitutional claims against
the treaty and its Implementation Act, 1' 2 it guarantees that certain consti-
tutional and statutory objections to panel decisions will never be heard in
a federal judicial forum. 03 This across-the-board denial of federal question
jurisdiction could render the FTA unconstitutional per se. Stated simply, a
rule requiring some federal judicial forum for the adjudication of all federal
questions would condemn the FTA's relegation of antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty claims to an unreviewable binational panel. Although the
Supreme Court has never directly confronted this issue, the notion of
mandatory federal question jurisdiction draws support from such incidents
as Congress's reluctance to extinguish federal jurisdiction over portal-to-
portal claims until it had repealed the substantive basis for those claims.'
4
Despite the great intuitive appeal of the Story-Amar theory of mandatory
federal question jurisdiction, this frontal attack is likely to fall short. The
Supreme Court would avoid resting on such a broad proposition in deciding
the constitutionality of the FTA. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly avoided
the much thornier issue of whether Article III requires a federal judicial
forum for all constitutional claims. 05 Nevertheless, to observe that the FTA
100. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early
Implementation and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 1515 (1986);
Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the
Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 749-50 (1984).
101. Akhil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 229 (1985).
102. See Implementation Act § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4) (1988) (guaranteeing right
to raise claim against constitutionality of FTA before CIT or D.C. Circuit).
103. See, e.g., In re Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork From Canada, Panel No. ECC-91-
1904-01-USA, 1991 FTAPD LEXIS 7, at *15-*18, 1991 WL 153112, at *15 (Extraordinary
Challenge Comm. June 14, 1991) (resolving, as absolutely final matter, dispute over whether
FTA panel had created due process principle contrary to American constitutional law).
104. See 29 U.S.C. § 252(a), (b), (d) (1988); Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d
254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948). See generally PAUL M. BATOR ET AL,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 376-77, 408 (3d ed.
1988).
105. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988); United States v. Mendoza-
Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 840-42 (1987); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568, 592 (1985); Touby v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1752, 1758-59 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 707-12 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
see also Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that jurisdictional
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violates Justice Story's vision of mandatory jurisdiction under Article III
suffices for academic purposes. A litigant before the Supreme Court,
however, would be well advised to attack the FTA on narrower, more
traditional grounds. Returning to my stated purpose of sketching a doctrinal
assault on binational arbitral review, I now outline two arguments against
the FTA under Article III jurisprudence after Crowell.
C. Removal and Replacement of Judicial Review
The pure public rights model and Crowell suggest two different consti-
tutional means for Congress to authorize non-Article III adjudication. First,
when a litigant claims a benefit voluntarily ceded by the United States,
Congress may condition claims under that "public right" upon waiver of
an Article III forum. Short of abridging due process, imposing an uncon-
stitutional condition, violating the nondelegation doctrine, or denying an
Article III forum for constitutional claims, °6 Congress may bar Article III
courts from hearing cases involving pure public rights. Second, Congress
may combine initial administrative adjudication with Article III review.
When federal law creates a right between private parties, modifies a pre-
existing state-law right,107 or provides a federal administrative forum, 108
Congress may commit initial determinations to a federal agency. The federal
judiciary then reviews these agency determinations according to standards
prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)'09 or some other
statute." 0
Before the adoption of the FTA, adjudication of the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws followed the judicial review model. Continued
reliance on review by the CIT would be constitutional. Indeed, as the
exclusive product of federal legislation, rights under the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws better qualify for administrative resolution than
those in Crowell or Union Carbide. In both of those cases a federal statute
supplanted a previous common-law right. The need for expert administration
amount requirement for review of Medicare benefit decisions did not preclude judicial review
of constitutional challenges to underlying statute, lest such preclusion constitute "a clear
violation of due process"); cf. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1987) (rejecting
argument that state courts did not provide adequate forum for assertion of constitutional
rights); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 684-85 (1981) (concluding that provision
requiring American citizens to litigate claims to Iranian assets in International Claims Tribunal
nevertheless permitted claimant to bring constitutional takings actions in federal court).
106. See Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 592-93; id. at-596 n.1, 601-02 & n.5 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
107. See Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 584-85; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 38-43
(1932).
108. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852 (1986).
109. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1301-1308 (1988); Schor, 478 U.S. at 853; Crowell,
285 U.S. at 44-45; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
110. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f)'(1988); Longshore
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), (c) (1988).
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of a complex area of federal law routinely justifies postponing access to an
Article III forum until an agency has rendered its initial findings of fact
and law. Nothing renders the pre-FTA law of antidumping and counter-
vailing duties any more constitutionally suspect than, for example, the
Federal Trade Commission's adjudication of antitrust and unfair competi-
tion claims.'1
Although the FTA creates neither an unreviewable legislative court nor
a system of administrative adjudication supported by judicial review, sub-
stitution of arbitral review resembles both models. From the "no-review"
perspective, the panel adds an extra layer of administrative decisionmaking
within an agency. Panelists would be supercommissioners, empowered to
reverse ordinary ITA and ITC decisions and immunized against further
judicial review. Panel review would satisfy Article III if Congress could
strip all judicial supervision under a "public rights" theory. From Crowell's
"adjunct" perspective, APA-style review of the agencies remains, but a
panel of surrogate judges replaces the Article III courts. This model demands
a far greater willingness to bend Article III's command that "[t]he judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested" in courts whose judges enjoy
life tenure and salary protection." 2
D. Public Rights and the Removal of Judicial Review
If the public rights model is to rescue the FTA from constitutional
condemnation, the FTA's defenders must first be able to define rights to
domestic trade protection as public rights. Any attempt to define the rights
subject to arbitral review as public rights is doomed for two reasons. First,
rights under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws do not satisfy a
strict definition that treats public rights as narrow waivers of federal
sovereign immunity. Second, the rights at issue also fail to qualify as public
rights under the Supreme Court's more recent functional definition, and
Congress's foreign policy objectives do not sufficiently tip the balance in
their favor. The FTA ultimately fails to satisfy the public rights model
because antidumping and countervailing duty laws create rights whose
adjudication neither involves the United States nor triggers a compelling
federal interest that requires unreviewable administrative resolution.
1. Domestic Trade Protection as a Public Right
"Public rights" disputes "arise between the government and persons
subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the consti-
tutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.""' Such
disputes involve "plaintiffs complaining about governmental decisions which
I11. See National Harness Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 268 F. 705 (6th Cir. 1920).
112. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See generally Joseph P. Verdon, Note, The Vesting Clauses,
The Nixon Test, and the Pharaoh's Dreams, 78 VA. L. REV. 1253 (1992).
113. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
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do not involve the direct coercion of private persons." " 4 The complementary
"private right" implicates "the liability of one individual to another under
the law as defined.""15
Defining rights under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws as
private rights could abruptly end Article III analysis of the FTA. Despite
the Supreme Court's apparent inability to articulate clear definitions of
private and public rights," 6 the distinction carries substantial weight. Con-
gress may deny the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in the adju-
dication of congressionally created public rights," 7 but not of private rights."'
This power to obviate the Seventh Amendment is coextensive with congres-
sional power to assign adjudication of a cause of action to a non-Article
III federal tribunal." 9 A defense of the FTA as an assignment of federal
judicial power to a non-Article III tribunal must rest on the successful
definition of rights under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws as
public rights. Conversely, a successful definition of these rights as private
rights could trigger a redefinition of Article III jurisprudence as breathtaking
as the condemnation of the legislative veto. 2
0
Abundant precedent supports the view that the federal government must
be a party to any dispute over a public right.'2' Such a view follows naturally
from the original rationale of the public rights doctrine: The United States
may condition any waiver of its sovereign immunity by limiting the forum
in which a claim against the government may be pursued.'2 Should this
theory prevail, the government's diminished role in an antidumping or
countervailing duty determination would virtually ensure the success of a
challenge to the FTA. Because the Supreme Court has already ruled that
"the Federal Government need not be a party for a case to revolve around
'public rights,"'1 however, the 'definition of the rights subject to FTA
arbitral review as public rights must be more circuitous. The prevailing
114. BATOR ET AL., supra note 104, at 410.
115. C~owell, 285 U.S. at 51.
116. See George D. Brown, Article 11 as a Fundamental Value-The Demise of Northern
Pipeline and Its Implications for Congressional Power, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 59 (1988).
117. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 455-58 (1977).
118. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989).
119. See id. at 53-54.
120. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)
("[T]he breadth of this holding gives one pause").
121. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 65-71 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69
n.23 (1982) (plurality opinion); Atlas, 430 U.S. at 457-58; Williams v. United States, 289 U.S.
553, 581 (1933); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279
U.S. 438, 451-52 (1929).
122. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land of Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 283-85 (1855).
123. Granfinancera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989); see also Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586 (1985); id. at 596-99 (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment).
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definition is whether "Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose
purusant to its constitutional powers under Article I, ... [has] create[d] a
seemingly 'private' right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory
scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited
involvement by the Article III judiciary."'
24
The rights subject to arbitral review under the FTA have a stronger
federal pedigree than the pure state-law claims in Northern Pipeline and
Schor or the limited right to compensation for compromised state-law trade
secrets in Union Carbide. Ultimately, however, whether the antidumping
and countervailing duty laws establish public rights depends on the litigants'
perspective. From the importer's viewpoint, these laws resemble but do not
equal public rights. Antidumping and countervailing duty laws involve the
United States as a taxing authority, but only to the extent necessary to
deter unfair practices. The duties serve less to enrich the Treasury than to
regulate international trade. Unlike ordinary taxes, which third parties
almost invariably lack standing to litigate, 25 duties imposed under these
trade laws entitle other "interested parties," such as protected domestic
producers, to contest ITA and ITC determinations. 26 Conversely, from the
protected domestic producer's viewpoint, these laws also fall short of
establishing public rights. No direct subsidies flow from the government.
Rather, the domestic producer enjoys the attenuated benefit of having certain
competitors burdened with extra duties. As such, the domestic producer no
more holds a public right than does a predatory pricing victim entitled to
relief under the antitrust laws. 27
2. Congressional Purposes
In scrutinizing non-Article III systems for resolving public rights, the
Supreme Court has considered "the concerns that drove Congress to depart
from the requirements of Article III.11128 In theory, the FTA's foreign policy
purposes would help justify a departure from Article III. The two govern-
ments hope that the panelists will develop the expertise to assist in passing
permanent, substantive trade laws. 2 9 Displacement of judicial review in both
nations gives each litigant at least two panelists of the desired nationality
regardless of which nation's law controls. 130 In addition, United States
Attorneys can assist American claimants in proceedings that would otherwise
belong in a Canadian court.' Some justifications for the FTA's departure
from Article III do parallel the rationales for territorial and military courts.
124. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 593-94.
125. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-61 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-46 (1976).
126. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(d) (1988).
127. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 13(a) (1988).
128. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
129. See FTA, supra-note 1, annex 1901.2, at 393.
130. See id.
131. See H.R. REP. No. 816, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 3-4 (1988).
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Lack of state sovereignty justified the establishment of legislative courts in
federal territories.'32 Similarly, federal and foreign free trade laws leave no
role for state law, state courts, or Article III federal courts exercising
jurisdiction over state-law claims. States will always lack power to establish
courts of general jurisdiction in the foreign half of a binational free trade
zone. Finally, to the extent that the Implementation Act has delegated
foreign policymaking power to the executive, that delegation is secure. 33
The foreign policy interest, however, does not justify the House Judi-
ciary Committee's reliance on Dames & Moore v. Regan'3 to support the
displacement of Article III courts.'35 Dames & Moore decided whether the
President had the inherent power to relegate private claims against a foreign
sovereign to binding international arbitration. 13 6 Because of the United
States' deference to foreign sovereigns, the claims in Dames & Moore closely
resemble pure public rights in that such claims survive only if the United
States chooses not to honor a foreign sovereign's immunity. 37 Having arisen
before Northern Pipeline, Dames & Moore never addressed Article III
doctrine. More important, the arbitrators' original jurisdiction in Dames &
Moore markedly differs from FTA panels' supervisory role. FTA panelists
are empowered to review, overturn, and issue commands to executive
agencies of the United States. Whatever latent Article III objections may
cloud the arbitral scheme in Dames & Moore, the FTA primarily concerns
whether panels may review agency decisions. 38
3. Panel Review as the Complete Removal of Judicial Review
A valid application of +the public rights doctrine would permit Congress
to remove all judicial review of the ITA and ITC, as it has done over
benefits decisions by the Veterans' Administration, 39 Medicare payment
decisions by the Department of Health and Human Services,' 4° actions of
the Attorney General under the Voting Rights Act,"" and milk marketing
132. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 402-03 (1973); American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.); cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530, 544-47 (1962) (plurality opinion) (rationalizing that desire to avoid surplus of federal
judges after territory attained statehood led Court to uphold territorial courts as valid legislative
courts).
133. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321-22, 327-28
(1936); Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 275 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1959); see also
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring
in the judgment).
134. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
135. See H.R. Rap. No. 816, supra note 131, at 15-16.
136. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675 (1981).
137. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f),
1441(d), 1602-1611 (1988).
138. See Albright, supra note 4, at 348-51.
139. See 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1988); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1988).
141. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(b), 1973c (1988); Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 504-05
(1977); Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 409-10 (1977); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 332 (1966).
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orders issued by the Department of Agriculture. 42 If characterized strictly
as revenue collection, the imposition of duties under the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws could constitute public rights. Traditionally, a
customs assessment did not warrant exclusive resolution in an Article III
court. In Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 43 the Supreme Court held that Congress
had the power to organize the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals as an
Article I court.' 44 If Congress could remove all judicial review under this
theory, panelists as supercommissioners could oversee the ITA and ITC,
much as a Cabinet secretary oversees agencies within a department.
This entire argument depends on the success of defining the rights
subject to the FTA as "public rights." The failure of the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws to create a pure public right proves fatal to this
argument. These laws do not benefit domestic producers by distributing
government grants. One can limit the public rights cases to the original
rationale for consigning the litigation of public rights to non-Article III
tribunals: When the government confers a direct benefit, it may exercise its
sovereign immunity and condition the beneficiary's forum for litigating any
right to that benefit. 4 Affected importers pay the extra duties not so much
as a tax, but rather as a penalty for unfair competition. The importer's
right to intervene suggests that antidumping and countervailing duties "tax"
importers principally to punish price discrimination across national bor-
ders. 46 The extra duties are less a revenue-enhancer than they are a fine
for a transnational antitrust violation, decoupled from the injured domestic
party's losses. 47 From the importer's perspective, these trade laws govern
142. See Block v. Community Nutrition Inst.,'467 U.S. 340, 345-48 (1984).
143. 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
144. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 459 (1929); see also Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 542-43, 544 (1962) (plurality opinion) (overruling Bakelite insofar as
that case characterized Court of Customs and Patent Appeals as non-Article III court, but
reaffirming Congress's power to establish legislative courts to decide public rights).
145. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67
(1982) (plurality opinion); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 272, 283-84 (1856); see also Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 66-68
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
This positivistic rationale for the adjudication of public rights in non-Article III tribunals
faces attack along several lines. Congressional limitations on the litigation of public rights
could be attacked as "unconstitutional conditions." See Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 212-13.
Moreover, the notion that the Congress which confers a public right is free to define the
conditions under which that right may be adjudicated smacks of the discredited "bitter with
the sweet" theory of procedural due process, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 539-41 (1985) (overruling Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974) (plurality
opinion)), and of the anachronistic right-privilege distinction, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 262 (1970). See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADmINIsTRATIvE LAW AND PROCESS
227-48 (1985) (discussing shift from notions of pure "privilege" to notions of entitlement).
146. Cf. Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988); Utah Pie Co. v. Conti-
nental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
147. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Detrebling Versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons
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"the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined," a
matter of private rights.148 Therefore, the FTA cannot constitutionally
eliminate judicial review of administrative determinations under these laws.
Even if the Supreme Court could twist the pliable definition of public
rights to accommodate the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, it
would have difficulty accepting the FTA as supercommissioners. Unlike a
Cabinet secretary who supervises decisions by administrative law judges
within his department, the panelists have nothing resembling a principal-
agent relationship to the commissioners whom they review. Rather, the
panelists exercise an external check on the agencies, much as CIT judges
would. Consequently, viewing the panelists as surrogate judges (and panel
review as surrogate judicial review) seems more realistic than pretending
that panelists wield extraordinary executive power within the agencies.
E. Panel Review as a Substitute for Judicial Review
Because treating the panel review system as a complete removal of
judicial review cannot satisfy Article III, arbitral review must be reconciled
as an adequate substitute for judicial review. Even this remedy cannot rescue
the FTA if one believes that Article III requires "adequately searching
appellate review" of all cases decided by tribunals established under federal
law without tenure and salary protections. 49 From the litigants' perspective,
arbitral review must offer all the protections of adjudication before a
politically insulated Article III judge. Since a litigant can waive this private
interest by consenting to non-Article III adjudication, a party invoking
arbitral review may undermine his Article III claims even if arbitration fails
far short of proper judicial review. In addition, in transferring a substantial
portion of the federal courts' "essential attributes" to a nonjudicial tribunal,
the FTA encounters an Article III objection that no private consent can
overcome. Regardless of consent, the federal judiciary has a separate,
structural interest against the passive encroachment of their role Within the
tripartite system of government.5 0
from the Theory of Enforcement, in PRIVATE ANTrmUsT LrIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW
LEARNING 87, 89-92 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988); Warren F. Schwartz, An Overview of the'
Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEo. L.J. 1075, 1092-96 (1980).
For analyses of American and Canadian antidumping laws as responses to predatory
pricing across national borders, see Douglas E. Rosenthal, Antitrust Implications of the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement, 57 ANTITEusr L.J. 485 (1988); Charles F. Rule, Claims
of Predation in a Competitive Market Place: When is an Antitrust Response Appropriate?,
57 ANTTuUsT L.J. 421 (1988). Applied extraterritorially, American antitrust laws also patrol
predatory and other anticompetitive behavior abroad when foreign behavior directly, substan-
tially, and foreseeably affects the United States and its foreign trade. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a
(1988); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962);
United 'States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 440-45 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.);
Joseph P. Griffin, The Impact on Canada of the EIraterritorial Application of the U.S.
Antitrust Laws, 57 ANrusT L.J. 435 (1988).
148. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932).
149. See Fallon, supra note 65, at 924 n.56, 974.
150. See generally FEDERALiST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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1. The FTA's Surrogate Protections
The FTA does not entirely deprive private litigants of procedural
protection. A code of procedure binds FTA panels. 5' The panelists apply
the same standard of review that would prevail in the CIT.5 2 Like federal
courts, FTA panels regard themselves as adjudicatory bodies of limited
jurisdiction and will examine whether they have jurisdiction under the terms
of the FTA and the Implementation Act before reaching the merits of a
dispute. 53 An extraordinary challenge committee then supplies one last check
against a panel tainted by misconduct. 54 Thus, a litigant gets two layers of
review beyond the administrative level: (1) APA-style review by a panel,
and (2) a highly deferential review for fraud, which alone was sufficient to
uphold the FIFRA scheme in Union Carbide.55 Finally, the Implementation
Act guarantees an Article III forum for constitutional challenges, either in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or
the CIT.
56
As a pragmatic matter, panelists may more deftly navigate the com-
plexities of international trade laws than Article III judges can. Expertise
alone, however, cannot justify the wholesale displacement of the federal
judiciary. That Congress is willing to confer Article III status upon CIT
judges undermines the notion that panelists can outperform judges. More
important, the panelists are in some respects the very antithesis of Article
III judges with life tenure and salary protection. Each year the Trade
Representative must reconstruct for Congress the formal roster of panel
candidates; upon each request for arbitral review, she must help assemble
a new panel. Together, the Canadian and American governments pay each
panelist 400 Canadian dollars per day. 7 The governments set this rate in
an exchange of letters between national FTA Secretaries. 58 Unlike the CIT,
which Article III insulates from the political pollution of periodic reappoint-
ment and threatened salary reductions, FTA panels face the constant menace
of political manipulation from both the executive and legislative branches
of two national governments. As in Northern Pipeline, the potential for
undue political influence renders this nonjudicial panel unconstitutional.
2. The Litigants' Consent to a Non-Article III Forum
Even if panel review cannot adequately replace judicial review, the
litigants' consent to panel review may help insulate the FTA from Article
151. See FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(6), (14), at 388-89; 19 C.F.R. § 56 (1992).
152. See FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(3), at 387.
153. See In re Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equip. from
Canada, Panel Nos. USA-89-1906-02, USA-89-1904-03, USA-89-1904-05, 1989 FTAPD LEXIS
2, at *8-*10 (Binational Panel Nov. 28, 1989).
154. See FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(13), at 388-89.
155. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592 (1985).
156. See Implementation Act § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4) (1988).





III attack. Consent analysis helped save the non-Article III scheme in
Schor,'5 9 and bankruptcy judges after Northern Pipeline may take jurisdic-
tion over state-law counterclaims if the parties agree.16° All three opinions
in Northern Pipeline focused on the absence of consent to initial adjudication
by a non-Article III tribunal. 16 More recently, the Supreme Court has held
that litigants' consent cures any "constitutional infirmity in the delegation
of felony trial jury selection to a magistrate." 6 2 Any consent analysis is
necessarily limited, however, for litigants' consent cannot confer subject-
matter jurisdiction on federal courts beyond the limits of Article 111.163
Even if consent analysis does not address the structural integrity of
tripartite government, consent (or its absence) does help a court determine
whether a non-Article III scheme for adjudication is fair to litigants. Consent
may deprive an importer of standing to attack the FTA's arbitral review
system. 64 Concededly, the importer no more consents to the initial admin-
istrative forum than an initial FIFRA registrant consents to arbitration of
its entitlement to compensation from follow-on registrants.1 65 The compul-
sory nature of the initial forum evaporates at the review stage. Although
the importer's strong interest against the imposition of an antidumping or
countervailing duty may entitle it to some Article III forum, the importer
will typically be the party requesting binational panel review. On review,
the domestic producer would probably prefer the all-American CIT over a
panel that includes as many as three Canadians. The importer's implicit
power of "removal" ensures panel review regardless of the agencies' deci-
sion. As a result, should the importer object to the panel's final decision,
its request for (and implicit consent to) arbitration by a panel rather than
adjudication by the CIT will severely undercut its constitutional challenge.
Conversely, consent from the protected domestic producer's perspective
would more readily justify total elimination of review. To benefit from
trade protection, a domestic producer must consent to an initial adminis-
trative forum. Indeed, only the grace of the government entitles this party
to litigate at all; standing doctrine ordinarily denies one party the right to
159. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1986).
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1988). But see Jeffrey T. FerrielI, Constitutionality of the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109 (1989)
(arguing that Congress did not adequately cure constitutional defects exposed by Northern
Pipeline).
161. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 79 n.31
(1982) (plurality opinion); id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 95
(White, J., dissenting).
162. Peretz v. United States, I11 S. Ct. 2661, 2669 (1991).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 229 (1938); National ,Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 644 (1949) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
164. See Gelderman, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310 (7th
Cir. 1987) (holding that acceptance of Chicago Board of Trade's membership agreement
constituted member's waiver of its right to Article III adjudication), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
816 (1988).
165. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 573-75 (1985).
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contest another's taxes.'6 Yet this logic fails to justify total removal of
judicial review, because the benefits to the domestic producer flow from
impaired competition, not from the Treasury. Crowell and Schor permit no
more than an initial administrative resolution of a right affecting private
trade relations. Once Congress aids the producer by granting a right to
contest the absence of a protective duty against an importer, Congress
cannot foreclose judicial review or substitute arbitral review for judicial
review. In no sense has the producer consented to arbitral review. Indeed,
a producer who files for CIT review may find the appeal removed to a
binational panel. Ironically, then, although a domestic producer's interest
in an antidumping assessment is weaker than the importer's interest, the
producer has a sounder basis for claiming not to have consented to arbitral
review.
3. Protecting the Judiciary from Encroachment
Issues of procedural protection and consent address the litigants' private
interest in fair adjudication. Article III, however, also protects the judiciary
from encroachment by the political branches of government. Consent can
no more cure this sort of constitutional defect than it can confer subject-
matter jurisdiction on the federal courts in violation of Article III, Section
2.167 Consequently, Schor recognizes that Article III must shield the "essen-
tial attributes" of federal judicial power. 68 Admittedly, review of admin-
istrative action is not "the stuff of the traditional actions at common law
tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789."169 Nevertheless, Crowell con-
ferred upon modern federal courts a comparable role as the exclusive,
independent source for judicial review of agency decisions. Assigning this
role to a nonjudicial tribunal may not constitute active congressional usur-
pation of adjudicative functions, 70 but it sufficiently intrudes on the judi-
ciary's domain to offend Article III.
Most strikingly, the FTA lacks even a contrived rationale justifying the
program from a judge's perspective. Unlike schemes involving magistrates
or bankruptcy judges, 7' the FTA does not merely reallocate adjudicative
authority within the federal judiciary in order to reduce dockets or to
facilitate management of a specialized area of law. Rather, the FTA com-
pletely removes an existing area of traditional, essential judicial responsibility
to an outside institution that can most charitably be called an executive
166. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-61 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-44 (1976).
167. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986).
168. Id. at 851.
169. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
170. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959-67 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that one-house legislative veto of immigration determinations usurps.
essential judicial function).
171. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-158, 631-639 (1988).
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tribunal. Such a maneuver suggests that Congress may have "inten[ded]
... to transfer jurisdiction from constitutional to [non-Article III] courts
for the purpose of emasculating" the federal judiciary. 172 Though stopping
short of creating "a phalanx of non-Article III tribunals equipped to handle
the entire business of the Article III courts,"'' 7 3 the FTA signals the first
step toward such an erosion of "the judicial Power."
F. How the FTA Falls Through a "Gap" in Article III
At one level the FTA does offer an intuitively appealing way to represent
both the United States and Canada in resolving international trade law
disputes. The panel mechanism injects a binational balance missing from
CIT review. Indeed, most international commercial disputes are resolved
through private arbitration instead of adjudication. 74 Unfortunately, the
FTA falls into a gap between the pure public rights model and the judicial
review model. The rights at stake are federal but not strictly "public," and
the pre-FTA system of judicial review proves undesirable in the foreign
policy arena. Nevertheless, by substituting arbitral review for judicial review,
the FTA forges an unconstitutional compromise. If the right at stake involves
a direct government benefit, Congress may opt either to retain judicial
review, as with Social Security benefits, or to bar it, as with veterans'
benefits. But when the right at stake does not involve the government as
benefactor, Congress may not entirely displace the judiciary. At the extreme,
Congress may restrict Article III review to a minimal check on arbitrators
deciding a federal right rooted in state law. 175 In the absence of consent,
replacing federal judges with binational panelists nullifies Article III's pro-
tection of individual litigants. Regardless of consent, arbitral review upsets
the Constitution's delicate balance between the judiciary and the other
branches of government.
IV. VIOLATIONS OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
172. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 644 (1949) (Vinson,
C.J., dissenting).
173. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986).
174. See, e.g., RENt DAvED, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 16 (1985); Jim C.
Chen, Code, Custom, and Contract: The Uniform Commercial Code as Law Merchant, 27
TEx. Irr'L L.J. 91, 100, 118 (1992); Christopher W.O. Stoecker, The Lex Mercatoria: To
What Extent Does It Exist?, J. INT'L Aa., Mar. 1990, at 101, 108-09.
175. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592 (1985).
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Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
76
Already suspect under Article III, the FTA's binational panels also
violate the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. To be sure, Congress
has not openly aggrandized itself by usurping the power to appoint FTA
panelists.'" Even so, the FTA's scheme for appointing panelists not only
deviates from an explicit constitutional provision but also substantially
impairs the executive branch's role in the appointment of federal officers.
17 8
The FTA and the Implementation Act also curtail litigants' rights to
adjudication by constitutionally appointed officers. At least two members
on any panel are not appointed according to the Appointments Clause. If
some or all of the panelists are not properly appointed officers, the FTA's
defenders must argue that Congress may assign the power to review agency
decisions to private or semiprivate bodies or that a "fallback" provision
somehow salvages the ETA.
Unlike the Article III jurisprudence on congressional power to restrict
federal jurisdiction, Appointments Clause doctrine is fairly simple. After
clearing the relatively low hurdle of standing to assert an Appointments
Clause claim, 79 a litigant attacking the ETA on Appointments Clause
grounds would proceed in three steps. First, the challenger must show that
the Appointments Clause applies. Second, the challenger must show that
the appointment of at least one panelist fails to comply with the strict
procedures prescribed by the Constitution. Third, the challenger must stave
off affirmative defenses that purport to permit the allocation of federal
authority to persons who are not duly appointed officers of the United
States. The relative clarity of the constitutional text and the judicial doctrines
designed to implement the Appointments Clause make a challenge on this
ground far likelier to succeed than an argument based on Article II's
tortured case law.'8 0 One can expect the Supreme Court to eschew an
indeterminate balancing test.' 8' For these reasons, an attack drawn from the
176. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
177. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-43 (1976) (invalidating provisions of Federal
Election Campaign Act by which president pro tempore of Senate and Speaker of House
appointed four of six voting members of Federal Election Commission).
178. See Alan B. Morrison, A Non-Power Looks at Separation of Powers, 79 GEo. L.J.
281 (1990) (outlining three themes in separation-of-powers cases: explicit transgressions of clear
constitutional commands, active or passive encroachment of other branches' powers, and
substantial impairment of other branches' constitutionally required duties).
179. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2638-39 (1991); Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1962) (plurality opinion).
180. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124-37.
181. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983); cf. Public Citizen v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 486-87 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in- the judgment);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711-12 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Arnold I. Burns &
Stephen J. Markman, Understanding Separation of Powers, 7 PAcE L. REV. 575, 578-85
(1987); Martin H. Redish, Separation of Powers, Judicial Authority, and the Scope of Article
III: The Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 306 (1990);
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explicit commands of the Appointments Clause will probably escape the
confusion that has attended Article II scrutiny of other functions that are
admittedly executive but not exclusively committed by the Constitution to
the President.8 2 As a matter of litigation strategy, therefore, a challenger
to the FTA may find reliance on the Appointments Clause most rewarding.
A. Panelists as Officers: Does the Appointmen'ts Clause Apply?
The Appointments Clause applies only if panelists are officers of the
United States because the appointment of "lesser functionaries" and mere
employees need not comply with the strictures of Article 11.183 The Imple-
mentation Act's declaration that panelists "shall not be considered to be
employees or special employees of, or to be otherwise affiliated with, the
Government of the United States' 8 can no more exempt the panelists from
the Appointments Clause than can any other act of legislative fiat. Rather,
a functional test controls. The panelists are officers if they are "person[s]
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States."'' 8
If a postmaster first class, 86 a clerk of a district court,'8 an income tax
inspector, 18 and an army chaplain8 9 are officers, then the panelists "are at
the very least 'inferior Officers' within the meaning" of the Appointments
Clause.190 Indeed, as adjudicators of rights arising under treaties and statutes
of the United States, panelists exercise at least as much authority as special
trial judges in the Tax Court, who are considered inferior officers of the
United States rather than mere employees.' 9'
Stephen L. Carter, Comment: The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REv. 105, 132
(1988).
182. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (prosecution); Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (control of Presidential materials);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-07 (1974) (executive privilege); cf. Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 115-16 (1926) (inferring power to remove executive officers as necessary
complement to appointment power).
183. See Freytag, Ill S. Ct. at 2640; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162, 127 (1974);
Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890).
184. Implementation Act § 405(b), 102 Stat. at 1892.
185. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126; accord Freytag v. Commissioner, I11 S. Ct. 2631, 2640
(1991); see also United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1878) ("[AI1 persons who
can be said to hold an office under the government about to be established under the
Constitution were intended to be included within one or the other of these modes of
appointment. . . ."); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1867) ("The term
["office"] embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties").
186.. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); cf. United States v. McCrory, 91
F. 295 (5th Cir. 1899) (letter carriers).
187. See Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839).
188. See McGrath v. United States, 275 F. 294 (2d Cir. 1921).
189. See Chaplains for Army Hospitals, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 449 (1863).
190. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1974).
191. See Freytag v. Commissioner, I11 S. Ct. 2631, 2640-41 (1991); Samuels, Kramer &
Co. v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 975, 985 (2d Cir. 1991); First W. Gov't Secs., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 549, 557-59 (1990).
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The argument that international law rather than the law of the United
States establishes the panels' 92 fails to exempt, the panelists from the Ap-
pointments Clause. As the Supreme Court has noted in a different context,
"separation-of-powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activ-
ity."'193 The proper inquiry is whether the panelists act under international
or federal law. The Supreme Court recognized as much when it refused to
shield the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority's Board of Review
from separation-of-powers scrutiny merely because state law purported to
authorize the board. 194 As I have already shown, the FTA is constitutionally
equivalent to an ordinary domestic statute. 9 The panels review ITA and
ITC determinations under the authority of what is clearly a law of the
United States. 1 Federal law supplies the substantive rules that bind the
parties before them. 97 Finally, the panels have full, unreviewable power to
modify agency decisions. These factors leave no doubt that the panelists
act as officers of the United States.
Efforts to insulate the FTA from Appointments Clause attack by
analogy to an interstate compact'98 must likewise fail. The federal statute
establishing the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning
Council'" as an interstate compact agency ° allows the governors of Idaho,
Montana, Oregon, and Washington to appoint council members.20 1 In Seattle
Master Builders Association v. Pacific Northwest Electric Power & Conser-
vation Planning Council,2 2 the Ninth Circuit held that this scheme did not
violate the Appointments Clause because the council members acted under
the authority of a compact created by "substantive state legislation" and
therefore did not "perform their duties 'pursuant to laws of the United
States.' 203 Even if FTA panelists performed their duties pursuant to some
192. See H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 131, at 16; Christenson & Gambrel, supra note
4, at 430-35; Huston, supra note 4, at 540-46.
193. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989).
194. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2298, 2306-07 (1991).
195. See supra part II.D.
196. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1988), amended by Implementation Act § 401.
197. See FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(2), at 387; id. preamble, at 368; cf. Metropolitan
Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 917 F.2d 48, 53-
55 (D.C. Cir. 1990), aff'd, III S. Ct. 2298 (1991).
198. See Christenson & Gambrel, supra note 4, at 433-35. See generally Alan B. Morrison,
Appointments Clause Problems in the Dispute Resolution Provisions of the United States-
Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1299 (1992) (discussing and rejecting
this line of argument).
199. 16 U.S.C. §§839-839h (1988).
200. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall,.without the Consent of Congress,
... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State...).
201. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(3) (1988); see also IDAHO CODE § 61-1201 (Supp. 1992);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-4-401 (1991); OR. REv. STAT. § 469.800 (1991); WAsH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 43.52A.030 (1983 & West Supp. 1992).
202. 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059 (1987).
203. Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific N.W. Elec. Power & Conservation Planning
Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126
(1976)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059 (1987).
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sort of "international" law immunized from constitutional scrutiny, two
severe defects deprive Seattle Master Builders of any serious precedential
effect. First, a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact is undoubtedly
a law of the United States, 204 and it would defy reason to exclude officers
acting pursuant to this particular species of federal law from the Appoint-
ments Clause. Second, the Supreme Court's decision in Metropolitan Wash-
ington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc.205 has fatally undermined the Ninth Circuit's dispositive reliance on the
council's state-law origins. 20
6
B. The Process for Appointing Panelists
Of each panel's five members, at most three can claim appointment
according to the Appointments Clause. The two Canadian panelists cannot
be constitutionally appointed. The two American panelists may be able to
qualify for proper appointment as inferior officers, though doubts linger.
Finally, the Canadian government's role in "joint" appointment and the
FTA's alternative provisions for selecting a fifth panelist cloud the consti-
tutionality of that panelist's appointment.
1. Canadian Panelists
The Canadian panelists are simply not officers of the United States.
Canada does not select its panelists according to the Appointments Clause
of the United States Constitution. By guaranteeing the Canadian government
two selections on each panel, the FTA's goal of neutral, binational arbitra-
tion deprives the entire United States government of a role in these panelists'
appointment. American voters have no way to demand accountability for
the Canadian appointments. 20 7
2. American Panelists
The Appointments Clause provides two ways to appoint U.S. officers:
(1) appointment by the President with the Senate's advice and consent, and
(2) appointment of inferior officers pursuant to a statute by the President
204. See, e.g., Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S.
433, 438-42 (1981). The Ninth Circuit inexplicably failed to recognize this established principle
of constitutional law in its discussion of the Appointments Clause even though it cited Cuyler
v. Adams elsewhere in its opinion. See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1363-64.
205. 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991).
206. See Morrison, supra note 198, at 1307 (stating that in light of Aircraft Noise, it is
not at all clear that the majority opinion in Seattle Master Builders is valid now, if it ever
was").
207. Cf. 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 313, 315 (1900) (suggesting that judges of Permanent Court
of International Arbitration are not officers despite presidential appointment because "[tiheir
work is not only bccasional, but contingent upon ... an appointment [by] foreign powers").
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alone, a court, or a department head. 208 No other constitutional method of
appointment exists. 209 As described above, section 405 of the Implementation
Act instructs the Trade Representative to appoint the American panelists.
210
The constitutionality of this statutory directive depends on two factors.
First, the Trade Representative must be a department head, since she is
neither the President nor an Article III judge. Second, the panelists must
be inferior officers.
211
a. The Trade Representative's Role
(1) The Trade Representative as a department head-The Trade Act of
1974212 implies that the Trade Representative is a department head in the
constitutional sense. She heads an executive agency-the Office of the United
States Trade Representative. 23 After appointment by the President with the
Senate's advice and consent, the Trade Representative holds office at the
President's pleasure. 2 4 For diplomatic purposes she holds the rank of
ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.
215
Nevertheless, Freytag v. Commissioner216 has created an opportunity for
challenging the Trade Representative's status as a department head. The
Supreme Court had earlier suggested that a "Department" means "a part
or division of the executive government, as the Department of State,"
expressly "creat[ed]" and "giv[en] . . . the name of a department, '21 7 and
that "[t]he term 'head of a Department' means . . . the Secretary in charge
of a great division of the executive branch of the government, like the
State, Treasury, and War, who is a member of the Cabinet. '21 8 Relying on
these suggestions, the Freytag Court "[c]onfin[ed] the term 'Heads of
208. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 532 (1888).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1879); Public Citizen v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 483 & n.3 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment). But see United States v. Prive, 35 M.J. 569, 577 (Coast Guard Ct. Mil. Rev.
1992) ("Congress, in legislating for the land and naval forces, may provide for the designation
of judges within the military justice system in a manner not provided for in the Appointments
Clause"). This "military judges" exception is contrary to the Supreme Court's Appointments
Clause jurisprudence and probably wrong.
210. Implementation Act § 405, 102 Stat. at 1892.
211. See United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393-94 (1867) (upholding
Treasury Secretary's appointment of clerk pursuant to statutory authority); cf. Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding appointment of independent counsel as inferior officer
by special division of D.C. Circuit).
212. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
213. 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (a) (1988).
214. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926) (protecting President's "exclusive
power of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate").
215. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring that Senate advise and consent to
appointment of ambassadors).
216. 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991).
217. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1879).
218. Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920); see also United States v. Mouat,
124 U.S. 303, 307 (1888) (defining department heads as "members of the Cabinet").
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Departments' in the Appointments Clause to executive divisions like the
Cabinet-level departments. ' 21 9 The Court went so far as to suggest that the
term "Department" might be defined according to the "executive depart-
ments" whose "principal officers" may act (with the Vice President) under
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to declare the President "unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office." ' Although the Court declined to
address "any question involving an appointment of an inferior officer by
the head of one of the principal agencies, such as the Federal Trade
Commission,"'21 Freytag's emphasis on Cabinet-level status would logically
disqualify the Trade Representative from appointing inferior officers and
threaten to render unconstitutional any panel appointments by her.?2 Faced
with the likelihood that a strict reading of Freytag would condemn the
appointment of inferior officers by all non-Cabinet agency heads,23 however,
the Court may well retreat and hold that any executive officer appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and authorized
to head a separate functional unit of the executive branch may constitu-
tionally appoint inferior officers?2'
(2) Flaws in the Trade Representative's Role-Two flaws cast doubt on
the Trade Representative's role in appointing panelists. First, interagency
appointment seems inappropriate, perhaps even unconstitutional. The Trade
Act establishes the Office of the Trade Representative within the Executive
Office of the President.?5 By contrast, the ITA is an arm of the Department
of Commerce,22 and the ITC is an independent agency.27 If panelists
qualify as members of these agencies, the Trade Representative would be
appointing other agencies' officers. Although Morrison v. Olson22 deflected
an arguably stronger objection to interbranch appointments by recognizing
the courts' limited power to appoint special independent prosecutors as
inferior executive officers, "29 interagency appointments raise their own dis-
219. Freytag v. Commissioner, II S. Ct. 2631, 2643 (1991).
220. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXV, § 4.
221. Freytag, 111 S. Ct. at 2643 n.4.
222. See id. at 2642-43 (declining to find chief judge of Tax Court department head for
Appointments Clause purposes).
223. See id. at 2659 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Scalia's separate opinion identified several inferior officers whose appointments would
be rendered constitutionally suspect. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 4a(c) (1988) (general counsel of
Commodity Futures Trading Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 42 (1988) (secretary of Federal Trade
Commission); id. § 78d(b) (various officers of Securities and Exchange Commission); 47 U.S.C.
§ 155(0 (1988) (managing director of Federal Communications Commission).
224. Cf. Silver v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that Postal Service is "department" whose head may constitutionally appoint inferior officers
because reorganization of former Cabinet-level Post Office Department "did not render what
was once a Cabinet-level department into an entity that was not 'like a Cabinet level
department').
225. See 19 U.S.C. § 2171(a) (1988).
226. See 15 U.S.C. § 1511(g) (1988).
227. See 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a), (f) (1988).
228. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
229. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 673-77 (1988).
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tinct concerns. The specific reference in the second prong of the Appoint-
ments Clause to "Heads of Departments" and not principal officers in
general suggests that a department head's power to appoint inferior officers
extends no further than his department. A similar qualification need not
confine the courts' appointment powers. As Morrison acknowledged, courts
represent a coequal branch of government in their constant interactions with
executive officers and have historically appointed interim United States
Attorneys.2 30 By contrast, a department head has no legal responsibility
outside his more limited domain. Empowering a department head to appoint
officers within other agencies may unduly interfere with general executive
functions.23' This concern looms even larger if the interference affects an
independent agency, which "cannot in any proper sense be characterized as
an arm or an eye of the executive," 23 2 especially if the agency exercises
quasi-judicial powers.2 3
Second, Congress may become impermissibly involved in selecting Amer-
ican members for the binational roster of panel candidates. 4 Though the
case law has yielded no clear rules on the extent of executive power to
remove officers, the cases uniformly hold that Congress may not reserve
for itself a role in the removal of executive officers.25 Congressional
usurpation of the executive power of removal constitutes one of the grossest
examples of active encroachment on a coordinate branch's powers.2 6 Indeed,
fear that legislators would abuse the appointment power may have motivated
the Framers of the Constitution to entrust most control over appointments
to the executive.237 Excessive entanglement would offend the principle that
Congress may obstruct executive decisions only by enacting a properly
presented law.238 The Implementation Act requires the Trade Representative
to submit a preliminary list of candidates to the Senate Finance Committee
and the House Ways and Means Committee by January 3 of each year.2 3 9
The Trade Representative must then "consult" each committee. 240 After
consulting and notifying these committees, the Trade Representative may
230. See id. at 676-77.
231. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
232. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (dicta).
233. See id.; Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353, 356 (1958).
234. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126-40 (1976); Springer v. Phillipine Islands,
277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) (holding that Congress may not exercise executive authority by
retaining power to appoint executive officers).
235. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 724-26 (1986).
236. See THE FEDERAuST No. 47 (James Madison); Morrison, supra note 178, at 285.
237. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 129-31; THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison); THE
FEDERALIST No. 71 (Alexander Hamilton); James Madison, Journal of the Constitutional
Convention Debates, in 2 THE REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 42, 74, 76
(Max Farrand rev. ed. 1966);.Cheryl A. Marquardt, Comment, The Appointments Clause: A
Battle Between Formalism and Pragmatism, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 1043, 1045-46 (1992).
238. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983).
239. See Implementation Act § 405(a)(3)(A), 102 Stat. at 1889.
240. Id. § 405(a)(3)(B), 102 Stat. at 1889.
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add or delete candidates from the preliminary list.?' By March 31 the Trade
Representative must submit to each committee the final list for a one-year
period beginning April 1.242 All proposed changes in the list must undergo
congressional consultation and notification.243
Though this process enmeshes Congress in the selection of panel can-
didates, it probably will not raise serious constitutional concerns. The
Implementation Act merely formalizes Congress's practical power to influ-
ence the selection of candidates. Even without this provision, any key
member of the Senate Finance Committee or the House Ways and Means
Committee could still object to a candidate or recommend a crony. The
committees' ability to shape the Trade Representative's preliminary list does
not amount to a power to submit lists of recommended appointees. 2"
Congress exerts at most the power to recommend candidates for FTA
panels.us Though disturbing, such a power of recommendation has survived
constitutional scrutiny.2 6 By contrast, "substantial power over the appoint-
ment and removal" of panelists would give Congress unconstitutional con-
trol over officers performing an executive or judicial function.247
b. The Panelists as Inferior Officers
Whether panelists are inferior officers is somewhat unclear. FTA panels
can vacate and remand decisions by federal agencies; one hesitates to assert
that an officer who can review agency decisions is "inferior." Moreover,
the panelists hold much more authority than such archetypal inferior officers
as mall carriers, court clerks, and Army chaplains. 24 Although the Supreme
Court has held that federal commissioners with various judicial and pros-
ecutorial ppwers are inferior officers, 249 such commissioners are more akin
241. See id. § 405(a)(3)(C), 102 Stat. at 1889.
242. See id. § 405(a)(4)(A), 102 Stat. at 1889.
243. See id. § 405(a)(5), 102 Stat. at 1889-90.
244. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) (noting that Speaker of House and
Senate president pro tempore recommend list of three individuals for Comptroller General as
evidence that Comptroller is legislative officer).
245. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988) (requiring that President "considera" Judicial Con-
ference's recommended appointments to United States Sentencing Commission); 31 U.S.C.
§ 703(a) (1988) (providing that congressional commission "recommend" individuals for selection
as Comptroller General).
246. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 368, 397 (1989); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at
727-28 & n.6 (observing that Congress could recommend Comptroller General but relying on
congressional power to remove as basis for striking down portions of Gramm-Rudman Act).
247. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc., II1 S. Ct. 2298, 2308 (1991) (condemning 49 U.S.C. APP: § 2456(0(1) (1988), which
requires that 'selected members of Congress sit on Board of Review with power to veto
Washington area airports authority); see also Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726-27.
248. See Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 519 (D.D.C. 1986),
aff'd on other grounds, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
. 249. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1931); cf. Ex
parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1880) (characterizing federal election supervisors charged
with oversight of congressional elections as inferior officers).
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to prosecutors than to FTA panelists,20 who operate as surrogate appellate
judges.
As the latest authoritative pronouncement on the classification of prin-
cipal and inferior officers, Morrison v. Olsonzs' should provide some guid-
ance. Neither the FTA nor its Implementation Act provides for removal of
a sitting panelist. This deficiency alone could prevent FTA panelists from
being inferior officers.2 2 Nevertheless, FTA panelists do display certain
characteristics that Morrison linked with inferior officers. The Implemen-
tation Act allows the Trade Representative not to renew a candidate's
eligibility or not to name an eligible candidate to a panel. In addition, the
panelists have limited power. They review administrative determinations,
but only of the ITA and ITC.253 Finally, each panel has jurisdiction over a
single controversy. Each new request for arbitral review could involve an
entirely new panel.
A mechanistic application of Morrison in this highly different factual
situation, however, may prove misleading. The commissioners of the ITA
and ITC are undisputedly principal officers. Ordinarily only two classes of
officers may review and overturn these officers' determinations-higher-
ranking executive officers and judges exercising judicial review. The power
to review and remand agency adjudication is no ministerial task; it is instead
the quintessential discretionary task. A functional description of the panelists
as either supercommissioners or surrogate judges leaves little room for
calling them inferior officers. On the other hand, the very status of surrogacy
would suggest that the panelists are inferior officers to the extent that they
perform the duties of principal officers "for a limited time and under
special and temporary conditions. '254
3. The Fifth Panelist
The FTA contemplates three methods for selecting the fifth panelist:
(1) joint appointment by Canada and the United States, (2) selection by the
other four panelists should the governments fail to agree, and (3) selection
by lot should the panelists fail to agree. 2 5 The second and third methods
are unconstitutional. The Constitution does not permit appointment of
inferior officers by private parties or by lot.
Constitutional appointment of this panelist is nonetheless possible. The
Implementation Act permits the Trade Representative to "act to make a
250. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694 n.8 (1974) (describing Watergate
special prosecutor as "subordinate officer").
251. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
252. See id. at 671.
253. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 659, 671-73 (1988) (describing independent counsel's
"limited" mission and jurisdiction).
254. United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898) (using this reasoning to define
"vice-consul" as "subordinate officer" despite Appointment Clause's specific reference to
"Consuls" as principal officers).
255. See FTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(3), at 393.
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joint appointment with the Government of Canada, under the terms of the
Agreement, of any individual who is a citizen or national of the United
States to serve as any other member of ... a panel."' 2 6 In theory, an
agreement between the Trade Representative and the Canadian government
to appoint a Canadian fifth panelist might not qualify as an appointment
by the Trade Representative. Even if the governments choose an American,
the Trade Representative's "act[ing] to make a joint appointment" may not
be an appointment in the constitutional sense.2 7 Freely allowing the Trade
Representative to appoint the fifth panelist contradicts the FTA's intent to
create balanced arbitration. On the other hand, any jointly negotiated
"appointment" lacks the unilateral discretion contemplated by the Appoint-
ments Clause.
As a practical matter, the Trade Representative does appoint the fifth
panelist about half the time. In negotiating the fifth appointment, the
Canadians and the Office of the Trade Representative usually flip a coin.28
The winning government unilaterally appoints the fifth panelist. Guided by
a "general sense of equity," the two governments will alternately name the
fifth panelist if two requests for arbitral review occur almost simultane-
ously. "19 This approach to "joint" appointment results in an equal likelihood
that the fifth panelist is either as properly appointed as the American
panelists or as improperly appointed as the Canadian ones. The extreme
arbitrariness of this solution undercuts the legitimacy of every panel.
C. Delegation of Federal Authority to Nonofficers
That some or all members of an FTA panel are. not appointed according
to the Appointments Clause does not end the constitutional inquiry. Indeed,
in a challenge against the FTA, proponents of arbitral review may either
concede that a prima facie violation of the Appointments Clause exists or
raise no more than a weak, perfunctory defense. Consequently, the real
Article II struggle over the FTA may turn on two defenses. First, the FTA's
defenders may argue that notwithstanding the Appointments Clause, Con-
gress may delegate federal power to persons who are not officers of the
United States. Second, the defenders may rely on the FTA's fallback
provision. Unlike the fallback argument, the argument favoring delegation
to FTA panels as private adjudicators has at least the virtue of being novel.
Whatever its merits in other contexts, however, this argument proves spe-
cious when advanced to support the panels' authority to review federal
agencies.
1. The Case for Delegation to Private Bodies
Having persuasively exposed the Appointments Clause defects of at
least three-if not all five-FTA panelists, an FTA litigant could launch a
256. Implementation Act § 405(a)(6)(B)(iii), 102 Stat. at 1891 (emphasis added).
257. Cf. id. (permitting Trade Representative to "appoint" American panelists).
258. See Interview, supra note 157.
259. Id.
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full-scale offensive and urge the Supreme Court to adopt the theory of the
unitary executive. 260 A stringent view of the unitary executive would lead
inexorably to the invalidation of the FTA upon proof of an Appointments
Clause violation, for the vesting of'[t]he executive Power" in the President2'
would require that duly appointed executive officers of the United States
administer all federal laws. 262 Although separate opinions by Justice Scalia
lend strong support to this view,263 the theory of the unitary executive has
never quite overcome the Sipreme Court's endorsement of the independent
agency in Humphrey's Executoir64 and its progeny. 265 Short of convincing
the Supreme Court to overrule Humphrey's Executor, a challenger to the
FTA will have to engage the defenders of panel review in a novel consti-
tutional dogfight over the permissibility of delegations of federal authority
to nonofficers.
Propounding a doctrine allowing delegation to nonofficers requires two
steps. The first step is simply to demonstrate that the Appointments Clause
by its terms poses no barrier to the doctrine. Although it prescribes stringent
procedures for the appointment of officers of the United States, the Ap-
pointments Clause does not explicitly forbid the delegation of federal power
to nonofficers. Such a ban, if it exists, must be inferred from the structure
of the Constitution rather than its text. The second step demands substan-
tially more effort: A defender of the FTA must draw precedential support
from the scant case law on this subject. Currin v. Wallace36 and Melcher
v. Federal Open Market Committee2 67 suggest that Congress may delegate
federal authority to persons. who are not officers of the United States. In
Currin, Congress granted affected farmers the power to veto the Secretary
of Agriculture's decisions on a program for regulating tobacco sales.M In
Melcher, a federal district court ruled that Congress could delegate some
of its Article I, section 8 powers to private persons, at least those acting in
concert with duly appointed officers.269 In addition, Dames & Moore v.
260. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Untary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HAxv. L. REv. 1153 (1992).
261. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
262. See Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations
of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. Rav. 62 (1990).
263. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2660-61 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 422-26
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 723-27 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); cf. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 815-18
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that prosecution for contempt comprises no part of
judicial function under Article III).
264. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
265. See, e.g., Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
266. 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
267. 644 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
268. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 6 (1939); accord United States v. Rock Royal Co-
op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1939).
269. Melcher v. Federal Open Market Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 523 (D.D.C. 1986),
aff'd on other grounds, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
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Regan20 upheld a presidential order that transferred outstanding claims
against a foreign sovereign to binding international arbitration.271 If two or
perhaps three panelists could qualify as properly appointed officers, the
panel would constitute a hybrid private and public body, much like the
Federal Open Market Committee. At worst, if none of the panelists are
properly appointed officers, the panelists would be a group of private
citizens empowered to review agency decisions. Currin upheld the grant of
a veto power to such a group. Dames & Moore supports both types of
delegations by suggesting that the executive's control over foreign affairs
issues can constitutionally justify international arbitration. 22
2. Objections to Delegation of Adjudicative Authority
At the simplest level, Currin, Dames & Moore, and Meicher lack full
precedential value on this subject. Neither Currin nor Dames & Moore
mentioned the Appointments Clause. Dames & Moore emphasized presiden-
tial power to assign claims to international arbitration, not congressional
power to delegate a governmental function to private persons. Furthermore,
the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Melcher that the district court should have
dismissed the case on grounds of equitable discretion undercuts the lower
court's ruling on the merits.
23
Beyond this superficial attack on these cases' value as positive law, two
crucial distinctions separate the FTA system from the nongovernmental
bodies in those cases. First, in creating the FTA scheme, Congress has not
merely delegated one of its exclusive legislative powers, but rather en-
croached on essential judicial functions. Second and more important, the
panels' role of reviewing agency determinations confers greater private
control over the governmental process than does an initial policymaking
role. Both of these factors support an Appointments Clause doctrine con-
fining "persons not 'Officers of the United States"' to the limited role of
"perform[ing] duties ... in an area sufficiently removed from the admin-
istration and enforcement of the public law. '274
a. The Congressional Role: Passive Encroachment
Despite allowing a partially private Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) to manipulate sales and purchases of treasury bonds, Melcher
conceded that "many responsibilities may be so intrinsically governmental
270. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
271. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 665-66 (1981).
272. See H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 131, at 15-16.
273. See MeIcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988). See generally Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d
873, 879-82 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (describing court's equitable discretion to dismiss action despite
plaintiff's standing).
274. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 139 (1976).
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in nature that they may not be entrusted to a non-governmental entity. ' 7
Review of agency decisions is the sort of core function that Congress should
not be able to delegate to private parties. (Of course, one could quite
credibly dispute Melcher's suggestion that open market operations-the
federal government's most important tool for effecting monetary policy-
could be lawfully entrusted to a partially private entity.) As argued above,
judicial supervision of administrative agencies deciding rights between private
parties has become one of the federal judiciary's central functions in the
regulatory state. Article III guarantees private litigants that they may have
their rights ultimately adjudicated by life-tenured, politically insulated judges,
even if an agency initially finds facts and interprets the law. 276 The Consti-
tution also ensures that the courts, not Congress or a party controlled by
Congress, will exclusively wield the federal judicial power.2" Though as-
signing this power of review to a private or semiprivate body does not equal
the "aggrandizement" condemned in Chadha, it does subvert litigants'
procedural protections and degrade judicial independence.
Although FTA panels perform primarily judicial functions, endorsing
the sort of private or semiprivate delegation that Melcher countenanced
would also permit Congress to denigrate executive power. Except in the
case of inferior officers appointed by "courts of law," the appointment
power rests exclusively with the executive branch. The President and "Heads
of Departments" select the officers who tend to the President's delegated
responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.
'2 7 8 If
Congress could arbitrarily assign substantial legal authority to private parties
not chosen under the Appointments Clause, each such delegation would
corrode executive prerogative over appointments. These delegations would
effectively "permit the execution of the laws to be vested in [persons]
answerable only to Congress" and "in practical terms, reserve in Congress
control over the execution of the laws. ' 2 9 Melcher overlooked this problem
when it failed to recognize that the presence of "private individuals not
appointed by or beholden to either [political] branch of government" could
indeed signal a congressional bid "to enhance [Congress's] own power or
to transgress the separation of powers."
280
Melcher wisely limited itself to congressional delegations of Article I,
Section 8 powers. The Necessary and Proper Clause does permit Congress
275. Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 523 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd
on other grounds, 836 F.2d 561' (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
276. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
277. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959-67 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the
judgment).
278. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117, 163-64 (1926).
279. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986).
280. Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 520 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd
on other grounds, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
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to effectuate "all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."2'
This expansion of Congress's legislative power should not justify the transfer
of another branch's functions to a private or semiprivate body. Subject to
the very light restrictions of the nondelegation doctrine, 282 Congress may
delegate its own legislative authority. Delegating an executive or judicial
function out of the government, however, smacks of a congressional attempt
to seize prerogatives that Congress does not enjoy, or at least to diminish
the role of the coequal branches. 2s3 To the extent Melcher permits Congress
to delegate governmental powers to private persons, it should not uphold a
delegation of federal power not based solely on Article I.
b. The Panelists' Role: Unaccountable Private Review
The private and semiprivate bodies-in Melcher, Dames & Moore, and
Currin all wielded some sort of original policymaking authority. FTA panels
have unique power to review a governmental agency. By adding a second,
private layer to the policymaking process, the panels isolate the underlying
ITA and ITC decisions from political accountability. Unlike even Dames &
Moore's reliance on the Iran claims tribunal, which reserved the possibility
of a Tucker Act suit in the United States Claims Court for a governmental
taking,2 4 the FTA seals off arbitral decisions from all governmental inter-
vention. No court or other governmental officer has power to review FTA
decisions on the merits. 215 Indeed, the Implementation Act purports to
commit the President to accepting and enforcing panel remands.2
6
Melcher accepted a hybrid private and public FOMC but relied on the
majority presence of duly appointed officers.2 7 Because the American and
Canadian governments generally flip a coin to appoint the fifth panelist,
officers of the United States form a majority on no more than half of the
panels convened. On the other half, the private, Canadian members can
command quite substantial authority under American law. Even when
281. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cI. 18; see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
- 421-23 (1819).
4  2 8 2. S ee A . L .A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452
U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union.Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment); cf. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407-09 (1928); Synar
v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1383 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), aff'd on other grounds
sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); see also Touby v. United States, 111 S. Ct.
1752, 1755-56 (1991); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989).
283. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
919 (1983).
284. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688-90 (1981).
285. See Implementation Act § 403(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(A), (B), (U) (1988).
286. See id. § 401(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(B) (1988).
287. See Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 523 & n.26 (D.D.C.
1986), aff'd on other grounds, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042
(1988).
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panelists appointed by the Trade Representative dominate, grave concerns
remain. The private members are never more than a single vote shy of
control. Besides, like the looming and unconstitutional congressional pres-
ence on the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority's Board of Re-
view,2 8 private representation in itself will influence decisionmaking even if
American panelists vote as a bloc or the entire tribunal seeks a consensus.
As Alan B. Morrison has observed, "it is not. the votes alone, but the
power to persuade, debate, and discuss that is at the heart of collegial
decisionmaking."2 9
Currin's facts present the best case for upholding the delegation of the
power to review to a private body. Indeed, Justice White has cited that
case for the broad proposition that Congress may delegate "authority to
issue rules and regulations" not only "to the Executive Branch and the
independent regulatory agencies" but also "to private persons. ' ' 29° The
tobacco program in Currin granted to affected farmers a veto power over
decisions by the Secretary of Agriculture. 291 As noted above, the Currin
Court upheld this program without addressing the latent Appointments
Clause problem. The petitioners attacked the Secretary's authority as an
excessive delegation of legislative power292 and the veto power as a violation
of substantive due process. 293 Even if the Court had considered and upheld
the private veto under the Appointments Clause, two crucial facts distinguish
the veto power in Currin from the FTA panels' power to review agency
determinations. First, the panels hold far more than a veto power. The
FTA empowers binational panels not only to affirm agency decisions but
also to review, vacate, and remand them on "general legal principles. "294
This formula invites far greater discretion to influence policy than does a
veto. Indeed, FTA panels exert more legal authority than the influential
FOMC, which adjudicates no rights, brings no lawsuits to enforce the law,
and "in no way exercises[s] direct governmental authority" over private
behavior.295 Second, Currin permitted the intended beneficiaries of a regu-
latory program to accept or reject proposed benefits. That legislation
"provided merely that [a proposed regulation] shall not be effective if those
primarily affected disapprove its application. ' ' 29 By contrast, the FTA
interposes a binational panel between the initial policymakers (the ITA and
288. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., I11 S. Ct. 2298, 2307-08, 2312 (1991).
289. Morrison, supra note 198, at 1303.
290. INS v. Chada., 462 U.S. 919, 987 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
291. See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 6 (1939); see also United States v. Rock Royal
Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 577 (1939).
292. See Petitioners' Brief at 26-29, Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939) (No. 275).
293. See id. at 29-31.
294. FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(3), at 387.
295. Committee for Monetary Reform v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
766 F.2d 538, 543-44 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp.
510, 523 n.26 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
296. Brief for the United States at 75, Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939) (No. 275).
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ITC) and the potential beneficiaries or losers under the international trade
laws. The FTA grants the power of review to third parties with interests
perhaps adverse to the litigants'. The Currin scheme at least permitted the
intended beneficiaries to approve a regulation before it went into effect. By
transferring the power of review to private panelists, the FTA not only
prevents those whose rights are affected from initially influencing policy
but also shields the ultimate decisionmakers from political accountability.
D. The Implementation Act's Fallback Provision
Perhaps anticipating a constitutional challenge to the panels' power to
demand ITA and ITC compliance with remands, Congress added a fallback
provision. If a successful constitutional challenge guts the panels, the
Implementation Act directs the President to accept panel remands "on
behalf of the United States." 297 Surprisingly, most observers have attributed
great constitutional significance to the fallback provision.298 The H6use
Judiciary Committee argued that this provision could insulate the entire
FTA from constitutional attack. 299 The fallback provision appears to be a
clever sham. The fallback clears only a single, minor obstacle. Absent any
enforcement provision, a decision rendered by FTA panelists as nonofficers
of the United States-as certainly two and perhaps three or five per panel
are-might not be legally enforceable. Union Carbide discussed but did not
decide whether a private party could secure judicial enforcement of a FIFRA
decision by a Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service arbitrator, who
was not an officer of the United States.3°° By arranging for the President
to issue an executive order accepting panel remands, the FTA fallback
overcomes this problem.
The falback cannot cure the panelists' constitutional infirmity under
the Appointments Clause. The original Gramm-Rudman Act similarly pro-
vided that a presidential sequestration order enforce budget reductions
specified by the Comptroller General. 0° Bowsher v. Synar 02 nevertheless
invalidated Gramm-Rudman's reporting provisions and affirmed the quash-
ing of the President's February 1, 1985, sequestration order. In Bowsher,
implementation by presidential order left the Comptroller, a congressionally
controlled officer, in true command of executive functions.303 Just as the
Gramm-Rudman fallback could not undo that statute's separation-of-powers
297. Implementation Act § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(B) (1988).
298. Compare Huston, supra note 4, at 541-42 (arguing that fallback provision cures
Appointments Clause objections to FTA) with Albright, supra note 4, at 327-28 (conceding
that fallback provision cures Appointments Clause defects before proceeding to criticize FTA's
constitutionality on Article III grounds).
299. See H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 131, at 17-18.
300. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 591-92 (1985).
301. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act §§ 251-53, Pub. L. No.
99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 718 (1986).
302. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
303. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 731-33.
14951992]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 49:1455
violation, the FTA fallback cannot cure the panelists' unconstitutional
appointment. This sort of provision can convert an otherwise advisory
opinion into a legally enforceable judgment, but any constitutional flaw in
the initial decisionmaker's role will also corrupt the implementing presiden-
tial order.
V. CONCLUSION: THE PrTF7ALS OF ARBITRAL REvIEw
As salient exceptions to free trade between Canada and" the United
States, antidumping and countervailing duty laws can undermine the FTA.
This concern, no doubt, led both nations to substitute binational arbitration
for traditional judicial review. Yet a government based on checks and
balances "rank[s] other values higher than efficiency." 3 04 Both Article III
and the Appointments Clause pose substantial constitutional obstacles to
the FTA. These obstacles protect the citizens affected by the trade laws by
preserving institutional safeguards built into the Constitution. Like all other
citizens in the United States-Canadian free trade zone, these parties will
reap enormous benefits from the FTA, but they should not be forced to
sacrifice rights assured them by the separation of powers. Adherence to the
Constitution's structural requirements ultimately benefits all by ensuring
that the compromises emerging from the political branches retain their
crucial core of accountability. As Justice Scalia has noted, "in the long run
the improvisation of a constitutional structure on the basis of currently
perceived utility will be disastrous." 30 s
The FTA's sense of "fairness" is predominantly international. Joint
American-Canadian appointment of panelists should help neutralize nation-
alistic bias. In theory the FTA entitles each government to two unilateral
appointments per panel. Because constitutional safeguards cannot patrol
this international system, however, the protections of the binational mech-
anism are largely illusory. Both governments abandon the formal roster of
panel candidates when they have trouble building a panel. 3 The Office of
the Trade Representative can cure its inability to name a panelist off the
formal roster of twenty-five eligible Americans simply by finding another
international trade lawyer and faxing this alternate's r~sum6 to Ottawa.3°7
This appointment may even repay a congressional favor. The litigants' right
to fair adjudication is not so easily satisfied. One call to Ottawa erases
whatever procedural protection a fixed roster offers. Worse, the FTA's
elaborate scheme for naming a balanced panel often dwindles to a coin toss
304. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919; 959 (1983).
305. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 743 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come, however, slowly,
from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the
most disinterested assertion of authority").




over which government may select the fifth, perhaps decisive, member of a
panel.
Within the American government, the FTA similarly sacrifices protec-
tion. The Implementation Act's sole protection against undue political
influence rests in its admonition that panelists be selected without regard
to political affiliation. °8 The true operation of the FTA overwhelms this
meek device. By substituting a binational arbitral panel for judicial review,
the FTA places the ultimate power of decision in a body wholly split from
the constitutional structure of American government. The American gov-
ernment's repeated efforts to disclaim any affiliation with the panelists
ironically symbolizes how arbitral review corrodes institutional protections
at both ends of the process for regulating international trade.3°9
At the review stage, panelists whose eligibility to adjudicate must be
renewed annually are far more vulnerable to political pressure than are life-
tenured federal judges. Though the American government describes the
selection of potential panelists as a competition based solely on legal
expertise, 10 the potential for political abuse plagues the selection process.
The daily pay for panelists may be generous for most people, but it scarcely
compensates these lawyers for lost opportunities. 3" ' (Indeed, low pay often
explains why the Office of the Trade Representative abandons the formal
roster of panel candidates.) The true incentive to serve on panels must lie
elsewhere. Most American panelists are trade lawyers or corporate counsel
to firms with a keen interest in import. restraints. Serving as panelists
enhances these lawyers' political prestige. The experience enables them to-
influence the development of both Canadian and American trade law by
adjudicating current disputes and perhaps advising future legislative revi-
sions. Though probably constitutional, Congress's involvement in building
the formal roster demonstrates the potential for political abuse. As the
Office of the Trade Representative has admitted, powerful members of
Congress can keep outspoken critics of prevailing trade policy off the
panels. 1 2
The FTA's appointment process not only subjects the litigants' interests
to cyclical controversies over trade policy but also infects the initial agency
determination. Though the FTA does not affect ITA and ITC membership
or procedures, the switch from judicial to arbitral review subtly changes
agency decisionmaking. The difference between a presumption of unreview-
ability and an expectation of judicial review for abuse of discretion can
influence agency behavior, even if a particular enforcement decision survives
scrutiny under either test.313 Likewise, an agency that anticipates review by
308. See Implementation Act § 405(a)(2)(B), 102 Stat. at 1888-89.
309. See id. § 405(b), 102 Stat. at 1892; FTA, supra note I, annex 1901.2(1), at 393.
310. See Applications and Nominations of Individuals to Serve on Binational Dispute
Settlement Panels, 53 Fed. Reg. 39,188, 39,189 (1988).
311. See Interview, supra note 157.
312. See id.
313. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 840-55 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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a politically biased panel rather than an Article III court may imperceptibly
alter its approach.
The technical demands of Article III doctrine aside, total withdrawal
of judicial review might prove less objectionable than the interposing of a
binational panel. Administrative law has relaxed the critical power of judicial
review since Crowell, 14 and many low-level agency decisions never reach
the courts at all, whether by law or because of practical considerations.
Political remedies such as the President's power to appoint the ITC chairman
and the Secretary of Commerce's pressure on the ITA curb these agencies'
discretion. The FTA panels' power of binding review undercuts these checks
by vesting ultimate decisionmaking authority on issues of international trade
law in a politically unstable and unaccountable body.
The Constitution demands that Congress, in balancing the private and
regulatory interests at stake, adhere to the institutional structures of Articles
I, II, and III. Proper federal adjudicative power ranges from the Veterans
Administration's unreviewable authority over veterans' benefits 1 5 to federal
district courts' exclusive jurisdiction over federal criminal prosecutions and
statutory causes of action under the federal antitrust, patent, copyright, and
trademark laws.31 6 Across the spectrum, the Constitution ensures fairness
and political accountability. The Appointments Clause, Congress's power
of the purse,3 17 and the ultimate weapon of impeachment3"' curb executive
discretion, even in the absence of judicial review. Conversely, Article III's
tenure and salary safeguards insulate judges from political pressure. Evasion
of these constitutional safeguards dooms the FTA to share the ignominious
fate of the legislative veto 19 and the Washington area airports authority's
board of review. 20
This country's separation-of-powers clashes have implicated a nearly
endless variety of political maneuvers by all three branches of government.
The Constitution contemplates most of these ploys and permits some. Those
who wish to scale a political edifice built on the bones and bathed in the
blood of electoral losers draw more than "worldly wisdom [from] the
maxim ... that 'The tools belong to the man who can use them.' 32' But
even as civilized nations at war demand-no more than name, rank, and
serial number of the basest enemy prisoner, the branches of government
314. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-44 (1984) (agency interpretations of law); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1983) (judicial review of "arbitrary or
capricious" agency action); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524, 539-48 (1978) (procedural requirements under APA).
315. See 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1988).
316. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1337-38 (1988).
317. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
318. See id. art. I, § 3, cI. 6; id. art. II, § 4.
319. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
320. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., IlI S. Ct. 2298 (1991).
321. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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established by the Constitution must refrain from certain political atrocities.
Although political warfare, like its real-life counterpart, will inevitably inflict
pain on its victims, constitutional provisions such as Article III and the.
Appointments Clause place absolute limits on the strategies and tactics that
this democracy will tolerate. By violating not one, but two, fundamental
restraints, the FTA offends the Constitution as political Geneva Convention.
For these political war crimes, binational arbitral review under .the FTA
deserves to be condemned with all the force the Constitution can muster.

